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NOTES
PARTY FOUL: THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S
IMPROPER APPLICATION OF THE
COMMERCIAL SPEECH TEST IN EDUCATIONAL
MEDIA CO. AT VIRGINIA TECH, INC. V. SWECKER
Michelle Silva Fernandes*
The pervasive culture of underage and excessive drinking on college
campuses has led to numerous federal and state regulatory efforts to reduce
drinking rates among college students. One such policy has been to restrict
alcohol advertisements in college student publications, which implicates the
First Amendment by limiting access to lawful commercial speech. Although
the Supreme Court has developed a four-part balancing test to determine
the validity of commercial speech restrictions, the Court has not articulated
the level of proof required for assessing the validity of restrictions on
alcohol advertisements in college student publications.
This Note focuses on the degree of constitutional protection that should
be afforded to alcohol advertisements aimed at college students. It begins
by exploring the background and development of the commercial speech
doctrine and focuses on the vice advertising subset. Next, this Note
discusses policies regarding alcohol use on college campuses and current
initiatives to reduce both underage and excessive drinking. This Note then
presents the split between the Third and Fourth Circuits regarding the
proper application of the commercial speech test when evaluating
restrictions on alcohol advertising.
Ultimately, this Note concludes that alcohol advertisements in college
student newspapers should be analyzed using the same standard as other
commercial speech cases. This Note proposes a resolution of the circuit
split by articulating a clear application and evidentiary requirement for the
commercial speech test regarding alcohol advertisements in college student
publications.
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INTRODUCTION
“Beer is living proof that God loves us and wants us to be happy.” 1

On October 9, 2010, police officers arrived at a Central Washington
University (CWU) house party and found nine underage freshmen passed
out and highly intoxicated, and dozens of others sick. 2 Given the disturbing
scene, police initially suspected a drug overdose, and several students were
After a full police investigation, however, officials
hospitalized. 3
announced that the students had fallen ill from binge drinking Four Loko, a
popular caffeinated alcoholic beverage commonly referred to as “blackout
in a can.” 4
Available in eight fruity flavors, Four Loko was marketed heavily to
college students from its inception in 2006 through the CWU incident.5

1. See George F. Will, Survival of the Sudsiest, WASH. POST, July 10, 2008, at A15
(attributing the quote to Benjamin Franklin).
2. See Shannon Dininny, Four Loko Sickened Several Central Washington University
Students, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 25, 2010, 10:17 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2010/10/25/four-loko-sickened-centra_n_773597.html.
3. See Student Released from Hospital After Spiked-Drinks Incident, CNN (Oct. 11,
2010, 5:53 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/10/10/washington.students.overdose;
see also Dininny, supra note 2 (discussing how, despite early police suspicions, Four Loko
was to blame for the CWU incident).
4. Alan Duke, ‘Blackout in a Can’ Blamed For Student Party Illnesses, CNN (Oct. 26,
2010, 8:19 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/10/25/washington.students.overdose/
index.html (identifying Four Loko as the cause of the CWU incident).
5. See Abe Sauer, Four Loko Declines to Own Its Marketing Strategy, BRANDCHANNEL
(Oct. 28, 2010, 11:00 AM), http://www.brandchannel.com/home/post/2010/10/28/FourLoko-Declines-To-Own-Its-Excellent-Marketing-Strategy.aspx (examining the Four Loko
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The drink came in colorful packaging, and the company’s advertising
focused on the college student market. 6 Students even created, with Four
Loko’s support, their own videos that they posted online. 7 Four Loko was
also inexpensive, and while popular among students, it did not attract
regulatory attention until 2010, 8 when it was blamed for several drinkingrelated deaths and accidents, and was subsequently banned in several states
and universities. 9
The viral Four Loko marketing campaign is an example of alcohol
advertising, a form of commercial speech. 10 Although alcohol consumption
is lawful, it is classified as a “vice,” a socially harmful activity, like
gambling or tobacco use. 11 These activities are typically subject to stricter
regulation. 12 Along with alcohol’s vice status, the culture of binge drinking
on college campuses has contributed to particularly strict regulation of the
alcohol industry and its advertising component.13
Commercial speech doctrine developed from a desire to protect
consumers’ interest in accurate commercial information. 14 The law did not
recognize commercial speech as protected until 1976. 15 Nevertheless,
viral marketing strategy using social media websites to gain popularity among college
students).
6. See, e.g., Abe Sauer, Four Loko in Danger of Becoming for Loco ‘Blackout’ Brand,
BRANDCHANNEL (Oct. 27, 2010, 3:00 PM), http://www.brandchannel.com/home/post/2010/
10/27/Four-Loko-Delivers-On-Blackout-Brand-Promise.aspx (highlighting the YouTube
videos and social media pages dedicated to Four Loko); Willy Staley, Four Loko Delivered
Just What Its Marketing Department Promised, AWL (Oct. 27, 2010),
http://www.theawl.com/2010/10/four-loko-delivered-just-what-its-marketing-departmentpromised (reviewing the various online rap videos dedicated to Four Loko).
7. See Staley, supra note 6.
8. See generally Meredith Melnick, ‘Blackout in a Can’: Alcoholic Energy Drinks
Keep Wreaking Havoc, TIME (Oct. 26, 2010), http://healthland.time.com/2010/10/26/
blackout-in-a-can-alcoholic-energy-drinks-keep-wreaking-havoc/ (discussing Four Loko’s
rising popularity and negative effects); Steve Wood, Four Loko Energy Drink Raises Health
Concerns Among Youth, USA TODAY (Nov. 10, 2010, 4:17 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
yourlife/parenting-family/teen-ya/2010-11-10-alcoholic-energy-drinks_N.htm (noting Four
Loko’s cheap price and high alcohol content, as well as the FDA’s focus on the drink).
9. See generally Jenna Johnson & Kevin Sieff, Four Loko Ban Fuels Buying Binge,
WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2010, 8:24 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/11/18/AR2010111806114.html (discussing state and university bans of Four
Loko).
10. See infra Parts I.B–C (discussing commercial speech).
11. See generally P. Cameron Devore, First Amendment Protection of “Vice”
Advertising: Current Commercial Speech Hot Buttons, 15 COMM. LAW. 3, 3 (1997)
(discussing how the First Amendment has been applied to vice advertising).
12. See id.
13. See, e.g., PHILIP J. COOK, PAYING THE TAB: THE ECONOMICS OF ALCOHOL POLICY
151–52 (2007) (noting that state governments regulate alcohol through the Twenty-first
Amendment, with each state free to adopt its own alcohol taxes and regulations).
14. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-history and Pre-history of Commercial
Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 747, 754–59 (1993) (giving an overview of commercial speech
doctrine development); see also M. Neil Browne et al., Advertising to Children and the
Commercial Speech Doctrine: Political and Constitutional Limitations, 58 DRAKE L. REV.
67, 77–86 (2009) (describing the federal agencies in place to regulate advertising).
15. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA.
L. REV. 627, 629–31 (1990) (discussing the evolution of commercial speech starting in
1976).
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commercial speech is referred to as “the stepchild of the First Amendment”
because it is provided less protection than noncommercial speech.16
Within commercial speech jurisprudence, courts have carved out a vice
advertising subset, which includes alcohol advertising. 17 Vice advertising
refers to advertisements for certain products or activities that the public
considers undesirable, such as tobacco and gambling advertisements, and
has been the focus of many regulatory efforts. 18 However, such regulatory
efforts are limited by constitutional considerations: after all, it is lawful for
adults over the age of twenty-one to consume alcohol. 19
The U.S. Supreme Court has developed a four-part balancing test to
determine the validity of restrictions that limit commercial speech.20
However, the Court has not articulated what type of proof is required when
assessing the validity of restrictions on alcohol advertisements in college
student publications. Currently, the Third and Fourth Circuits are split
regarding what evidentiary showing a party must make in determining
whether to uphold governmental restrictions on alcohol advertising in
college student publications. 21 The Third Circuit analyzed this issue in Pitt
News v. Pappert, 22 holding that a prohibition on alcohol advertisements in
college student publications unconstitutionally restricted free speech, due to
the government’s lack of evidence proving that the restriction directly
advanced the state’s interest and was narrowly drawn. 23 The recent Fourth
Circuit decision in Educational Media Co. at Virginia Tech, Inc. v.
Swecker 24 reached a conflicting conclusion, upholding a similar state law
despite a lack of evidence that the restriction directly advanced the state’s
interest and was narrowly tailored to meet that interest. 25 This Note
proposes a resolution to the split, advocating that the Supreme Court adopt
the Third Circuit’s reasoning and evidentiary requirements.
This Note discusses the background and development of the commercial
speech doctrine, with a focus on the vice advertising subset. Part I explores
the development and current position of the commercial speech doctrine
and discusses the evolution of vice advertising jurisprudence. It analyzes
current policies designed to reduce underage and binge drinking. In Part II,
this Note presents the split between the Third and Fourth Circuits regarding
the proper application of the commercial speech test when evaluating
16. Comment, Developments in the Law—Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1005, 1027–29 (1967) (discussing the constitutional status of commercial speech).
17. See Clay Calvert, Wendy Allen-Brunner & Christina M. Locke, Playing Politics or
Protecting Children? Congressional Action & a First Amendment Analysis of the Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 36 J. LEGIS. 201, 213–14 (2010) (discussing
the vice advertising subset of commercial speech).
18. See id. at 214.
19. See, e.g., Browne et al., supra note 14, at 104–10 (discussing how vice
advertisements can be limited).
20. See infra Part I.C.
21. See infra Part II.
22. 379 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2004).
23. Id. at 113; see also infra Part II.A.
24. 602 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 646 (2010).
25. See infra Part II.B.
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restrictions on alcohol advertising. Additionally, Part II discusses how
other circuit courts apply the commercial speech test in vice advertising
cases. Part III of this Note proposes a resolution of the circuit split, arguing
that alcohol advertisements in college student newspapers should be
analyzed under the same standard as other commercial speech cases.
Specifically, Part III posits that the Supreme Court resolve the circuit split
by clearly articulating the proper application and evidentiary standard of
the commercial speech test.
I. A LONG TIME IN THE BARREL: THE LONG ROAD TO CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION FOR ALCOHOL ADVERTISING
A. A Brief First Amendment Overview
The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press.” 26 The freedom of expression is a
vital, fundamental right. 27 While the drafters did not indicate what speech
they intended the First Amendment to protect, historians suggest that the
Amendment was a reaction to existing speech and press restrictions on
political expression. 28 The First Amendment has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court to protect against congressional, presidential, judicial, and
state attempts to abridge speech.29 This section provides background
information about the First Amendment and what it protects, including
commercial speech.
1. First Amendment Background
The text of the First Amendment created many ambiguities regarding
what falls within its scope of protection. 30 While the text of the First
Amendment contains absolute language, the Supreme Court has never
expressed the view that the First Amendment prohibits all governmental

26. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
27. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 14–17 (1992) (theorizing
that multiple justifications underlie freedom of speech); see also Steven Shiffrin, The First
Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1214–18 (1983) (stating that the multiple theories
underlying the First Amendment are all plausible).
28. See, e.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 1–10 (1941)
(discussing the drafters’ intent behind the First Amendment).
29. See DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1–2, 13–16 (2d ed. 2003)
(discussing the scope of First Amendment protection); Akhil Reed Amar, The Document and
the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 58–59 (2000) (noting that states have to observe the
First Amendment).
30. See CHAFFEE, supra note 28, at 16 (noting that the drafters did not define the
meaning of the First Amendment).
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restrictions on expression. 31 Rather, the Supreme Court has held that
certain restrictions on expression may be permitted for legitimate reasons. 32
The Court has established that different categories of speech are entitled
to varying degrees of protection. 33 Although there is no textual distinction
between commercial and noncommercial speech in the Amendment, 34 the
Framers were more concerned with protecting political speech, given its
importance to the democratic process.35
2. The First Amendment’s Stepchild: Commercial Speech
Although the First Amendment does not distinguish between
noncommercial and commercial speech in its text, the Supreme Court has
recognized such a distinction. 36 The commercial speech doctrine has
continuously evolved since its emergence in 1976, due to the Court’s
changing philosophy about how best to evaluate commercial speech.37
Courts have been reluctant to extend full First Amendment protection to
commercial speech, partially due to two prevailing ideas regarding
commercial speech.38 First, advertising should not be trusted given its
tendency to exaggerate. This was the impetus behind the creation of the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which enforces advertising laws in an
effort to protect American consumers.39 Second, commercial speech merits
31. See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (3d ed. 2008);
see also Hugo Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 874–79 (1960) (urging the
Court to take the First Amendment’s text literally).
32. See Louis J. Virelli, Permissible Burden or Constitutional Violation? A First
Amendment Analysis of Congress’ Proposed Removal of Tax Deductibility from Tobacco
Advertisements, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 529, 534 & n.31 (2000) (noting that libel, slander,
obscenity, and incitement are not afforded First Amendment protection).
33. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century: Ten Lessons from
the Twentieth Century, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 273, 273–74 (2009) (stating that despite a few
scattered free speech cases, the courts did not seriously interpret the First Amendment until
1919); see also David Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1207–09 (1983).
34. See, e.g., MICHAEL G. GARTNER, ADVERTISING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 8 (1989)
(stating that the Framers understood that it did not matter if information was conveyed
through advertisements or as noncommercial speech).
35. See EDWIN ROME & WILLIAM H. ROBERTS, CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL FREE
SPEECH 36 (1985) (noting that free speech is integral in a democratic system).
36. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 14, at 757–58. But see GARTNER, supra note 34,
at 8–11 (arguing that this distinction was contrived by the Court).
37. See Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the
Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 779 (1999) (noting that
commercial speech has no presumption of validity); see also Benjamin B. Nelson,
Regulation or Prohibition? The Troubled Legal Status of Internet Gambling Casinos in the
United States in the Wake of the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, 9
TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 39, 53–56 (2007) (discussing the Court’s shifting commercial
speech framework); Brian J. Waters, Note, A Doctrine in Disarray: Why the First
Amendment Demands the Abandonment of the Central Hudson Test for Commercial Speech,
27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1626, 1627–30 (1997) (advocating that commercial speech be
afforded full constitutional protection).
38. See THOMAS L. TEDFORD & DALE HARBECK, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE UNITED
STATES 192–93 (5th ed. 2005) (noting the reasons behind the anti-advertising attitudes).
39. See id. at 192 (discussing the FTC).
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less constitutional protection than political speech because it has “less
social value,” and is not essential to the democratic process. 40 Given these
factors, courts treated commercial speech as an element of business and
property law, and not as expression, from the establishment of the FTC in
1914 through the emergence of the commercial speech doctrine in 1976.41
Proponents of commercial speech protection argue that the First
Amendment is not limited to protecting political speech.42 Commercial
speech supporters also assert that because advertising serves an important
information purpose, restrictions on advertising should be subject to strict
scrutiny. 43
B. The Evolution of the Commercial Speech Doctrine
The Supreme Court has defined commercial speech as speech that (1)
constitutes a type of advertisement; (2) refers to a specific product; and (3)
represents an economic motivation by the speech’s owner.44 Initially, the
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not protect commercial
speech. 45 Increased awareness about the social value of certain types of
advertisements, however, persuaded the Court to reverse course and begin
This section discusses the
recognizing advertising as speech.46
development of the general commercial speech doctrine.
1. The Commercial Speech “Exception”
In 1942, the Supreme Court enunciated the commercial speech exception
to free speech law in Valentine v. Chrestensen. 47 In Chrestensen, the Court
adopted a bright-line rule excluding commercial speech from First
Amendment protection. 48
In Chrestensen, the Court considered whether a New York City
sanitation ordinance prohibiting the distribution of “commercial and

40. Id. See generally Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment,
81 IOWA L. REV. 589, 606 (1996) (arguing that the characteristics of commercial speech do
not necessitate that it be afforded the same protection as noncommercial speech).
41. See TEDFORD & HARBECK, supra note 38, at 192–93.
42. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 15, at 652 (noting that in a “free market
economy,” commercial speech may be as important as noncommercial speech). But see
Sylvia Law, Addiction, Autonomy, and Advertising, 77 IOWA L. REV. 909, 932 (1992)
(arguing that commercial speech should not be fully protected).
43. See generally R. GEORGE WRIGHT, SELLING WORDS: FREE SPEECH IN A COMMERCIAL
CULTURE 16 (1997).
44. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–68 (1983) (concluding
that a federal statute prohibiting all unsolicited contraceptive mailings was an
unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech under the First Amendment).
45. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (“[T]he Constitution imposes
no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising”).
46. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
378–79 (1973) (noting that commercial speech has some informational value).
47. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
48. See id. at 54–55; see also Kozinski & Banner, supra note 14, at 756–59 (discussing
Chrestensen).
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business advertising matter” 49 was unconstitutional as applied to F.J.
Chrestensen, who printed handbills that advertised tours on his
submarine. 50 After being informed that the handbill was prohibited under
the ordinance, Chrestensen revised the handbill to contain a mix of
commercial information and political protest language. 51
After being told that the new handbill was still in violation of the
ordinance, Chrestensen filed suit, asserting a violation of his constitutional
right to free speech. 52 The Supreme Court held that the application of the
ordinance to Chrestensen was not unconstitutional, as the intent behind the
handbill was commercial, and commercial speech was not protected by the
Constitution. 53 Under Chrestensen, if the primary purpose behind speech
was deemed commercial, that speech would not receive First Amendment
protection.54
2. Commercial Speech Protection Begins
In the thirty years following Chrestensen, the Court repeatedly applied its
primary purpose test to evaluate whether speech was commercial or
noncommercial.55 In 1973, the Court shifted its jurisprudence regarding
commercial speech in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on
Human Relations. 56 Pittsburgh Press involved a city ordinance that
prohibited newspapers from publishing classified advertisements that
discriminated on the basis of sex. 57 Although the Court ultimately upheld
the ordinance because gender discrimination was illegal, it indicated that
the advertisements would have been entitled to some protection if the
advertised activity was not illegal.58
The Supreme Court went further to protect commercial speech in
Bigelow v. Virginia. 59 In Bigelow, the Court evaluated whether a Virginia
statute prohibiting publications from printing abortion service

49. See Chrestensen, 316 U.S. at 53.
50. See id. at 52–54.
51. See id. at 53 (noting “that handbills solely devoted to ‘information or a public
protest’” were allowed).
52. See id. at 54.
53. Id. at 55.
54. See BRADFORD W. SCHARLOTT, THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF
ADVERTISING IN THE MASS MEDIA (1980), reprinted in ADVERTISING AND COMMERCIAL
SPEECH 1, 3 (Theodore R. Kupferman ed., 4th ed. 2004); Kozinski & Banner, supra note 14,
at 755–58 (discussing the legacy of Chrestensen).
55. See ROME & ROBERTS, supra note 35, at 4 (stating that “purely commercial
advertising or commercial speech [was] completely unprotected by the First Amendment”
for more than thirty years). But see N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)
(holding that paid political advertisements were protected and categorized as political, not
commercial speech).
56. 413 U.S. 376 (1973); see also Browne et al., supra note 14, at 89–91.
57. See Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 378.
58. See id. at 388–89; see, e.g., TEDFORD & HARBECK, supra note 38, at 200.
59. 421 U.S. 809 (1975); see also Browne et al., supra note 14, at 91–92 (noting how
Bigelow clarified commercial speech protection for certain activities).
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advertisements was constitutional.60 Justice Harry Blackmun, writing for
the majority, limited the Chrestensen holding by stating that Chrestensen
only determined that regulations regarding the distribution of commercial
matter were reasonable, not “that all statutes regulating commercial
advertising are immune from constitutional challenge.” 61 Justice Blackmun
went on to state that “speech is not stripped of First Amendment protection
merely because it appears [commercially].”62
The Court was more explicit about commercial speech protection in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 63 expressly holding that the First Amendment protects truthful speech
that “does no more than propose a commercial transaction.”64 The majority
stated that advertisements “may be of general public interest”65 despite their
commercial nature and noted that in a “predominantly free enterprise
economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made
through numerous private economic decisions.” 66
The Virginia Pharmacy Court stopped short of affording commercial
speech equal constitutional protection as noncommercial speech, stating
that commercial speech was still protected to a lesser extent. 67 The Court
indicated that the difference in protection was warranted by
“commonsense” distinctions between advertising and other speech.68
In the year following Virginia Pharmacy, the Court overturned
governmental restrictions on advertising for contraception, legal services,
and real estate sales. 69 While reiterating that it did not intend to equalize
constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech, the
Court did not specify the disparity of protection between noncommercial
and commercial speech. 70
60. See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 811–15 (noting that a Virginia editor had printed a New
York abortion clinic advertisement; abortions were legal in New York at the time).
61. Id. at 819–20 (stating that Chrestensen should not be understood as disallowing First
Amendment protection for advertising).
62. Id. at 818.
63. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
64. Id. at 762.
65. See id. at 764 (“[S]ociety also may have a strong interest in the free flow of
commercial information.”); see also Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial
Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 1–4 (2000) (arguing that commercial speech is constitutionally
protected because of the informational function that advertising serves).
66. Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765.
67. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 177 (3d
ed. 2007) (noting that cases subsequent to Virginia Pharmacy established an intermediate
level of scrutiny for commercial speech).
68. Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771–72 n.24 (noting that there are “commonsense
differences” between commercial and noncommercial speech).
69. See generally Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (striking down an
Arizona law prohibiting legal service advertisements); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431
U.S. 678 (1977) (overturning government ban on contraceptive advertising); Linmark
Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (invalidating a law prohibiting
the posting of “for sale” signs on real estate property).
70. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456–57 (1978) (noting that the
validity of a ban on legal solicitations was subject to a lower level of scrutiny because it was
commercial speech).
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C. The Standard for General Commercial Speech: Central Hudson
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission
of New York, 71 the Supreme Court established a four-part balancing test for
determining when the government may regulate commercial speech.72 This
section discusses the Supreme Court’s decision, and explores how the
Central Hudson commercial speech test has evolved.
1. The Central Hudson Balancing Test
for Evaluating Commercial Speech Restrictions
Central Hudson involved a New York State Public Service Commission
regulation banning electric utility companies from “promot[ing] the use of
electricity.” 73 The state argued that it could implement the ban because of
its interest in limiting electric utility use.74 The electric company
challenged the regulation by alleging that the ban violated the company’s
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 75
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the constitutional protection of
commercial speech.76 States seeking to uphold restrictions on commercial
speech, the Court held, must show that they have a “substantial interest” in
regulating the speech, in addition to proving that the restriction was
carefully drafted to serve that interest. 77 The Court then set forth the fourpart standard for evaluating commercial speech:
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed.
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by
the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that
provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.
Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If
both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. 78

In applying this standard, the Court found that the first two prongs were
satisfied, thereby establishing a relatively low threshold for meeting those

71. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
72. Id. at 566 (citing Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455–56 (1978)) (differentiating between
commercial speech that is regulated by the government and noncommercial speech).
73. See id. at 558–60 (noting that the challenged ban prohibited promotional advertising
for electrical services and was aimed at encouraging shifts of electric consumption away
from peak times and to off-peak periods).
74. See id. at 559 (discussing how New York had legitimate fuel shortage concerns,
which necessitated the need for energy conservation).
75. See id. at 560–61 (internal citations omitted) (remarking how the New York State
Court of Appeals upheld the commission’s order because they found little social value in
promotional electric utility advertising).
76. See id. at 564 (stating that government restrictions on lawful commercial speech
must be evaluated under the First Amendment to be upheld); see also Nelson, supra note 37,
at 51–52 (discussing the importance of Central Hudson).
77. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
78. Id. at 566.
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prongs. 79 The Court found the promotional advertising in question was not
misleading or related to unlawful activity, and thus entitled to some
The state asserted interests in energy
constitutional protection. 80
conservation and a fair and efficient rate structure.81 The Court agreed that
both interests were “substantial.” 82
The third prong asks whether the restriction directly and materially
advances the government’s interest. 83 The Court found that the state’s
interest in energy conservation satisfied this prong, agreeing with the state’s
argument that an advertising ban on utility services would lead to less
demand for those services. 84 Nevertheless, the Court did not find that the
state’s interest in a fair and efficient rate structure satisfied the third
prong. 85 The Court held that the connection between the ban and the state’s
interest in a fair and efficient rate structure was indirect at best.86
Applying the fourth prong, the Court placed the burden on the state to
prove that the prohibition was not “more extensive than necessary to further
the State’s interest in energy conservation.”87 The Court ultimately found
that the state did not meet its burden of proof because it failed to
demonstrate that there was no less restrictive means to accomplish its
The Court struck down the
interest in energy conservation. 88
Commission’s order as an unconstitutional infringement on commercial
speech. 89
Although Central Hudson established a standard for evaluating
governmental restrictions on commercial speech, the Supreme Court did not
define commercial speech until Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Products Corp. 90
Bolger involved a constitutional challenge of a federal statute banning
mailings of contraceptive advertisements.91 The advertisements at issue

79. See id. at 566–69; see also Browne et al., supra note 14, at 105–07 (noting that the
low threshold for the government to meet the first two prongs has persisted).
80. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566–68.
81. See id. at 568–69.
82. Id. at 569.
83. See id.
84. Id. (finding that the direct link between the restriction on advertising and demand for
electricity was “immediate”). This reflects a generally accepted view of Supreme Court
commercial speech jurisprudence: advertising increases demand, so a ban on that
advertising should lessen demand. See infra Part I.D.
85. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569.
86. See id. at 569 (“[T]he link between the advertising prohibition and appellant’s rate
structure is, at most, tenuous.”).
87. See id. at 569–70 (“[The state] has not demonstrated that its interest in conservation
cannot be protected adequately by more limited regulation of appellant’s commercial
expression.”).
88. See id. at 570.
89. See id. at 570–72 (implying that the state carried the burden to show that anything
less than the total ban on promotional advertising would be ineffective at furthering the
state’s interest in conservation).
90. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
91. See id. at 61–62.
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contained a mix of commercial and noncommercial information.92 Youngs
brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief claiming that the
statute violated its First Amendment rights. 93 The district court held that
the advertisements were protected speech despite the mix of commercial
and noncommercial information, and found that the statute’s absolute ban
violated the First Amendment. 94 The Supreme Court agreed with the
district court, holding the statute unconstitutional.95 Additionally, the
Supreme Court expanded its definition of what constitutes commercial
speech to include speech (1) that is a type of advertisement; (2) that refers
to a specific product or service; and (3) where the speech’s owner has an
economic motivation behind the speech.96
Since Central Hudson, courts have applied the four-part test to evaluate
the validity of governmental restrictions on commercial speech. 97 While
the first two prongs of the Central Hudson test involve a relatively
straightforward analysis and have been consistently applied by lower
courts, the third and fourth prongs have created a great deal of confusion.98
Much of this confusion stems from the fact that the Court in Central
Hudson did not provide any guidance regarding the burden of proof for
each prong or what would constitute sufficient proof to prevail.
2. The Supreme Court Shifts Its Stance on Commercial Speech
The Court’s application of the third and fourth prongs has shifted in the
years since Central Hudson, leaving an ambiguous standard in place. 99 In
the decade following Central Hudson, the Supreme Court was reluctant to
broaden the constitutional protection it had afforded commercial speech by
requiring a low evidentiary showing for the government to meet its burden

92. See id. at 66–67 (noting that although the mailings contained contraceptive product
advertisements and material regarding the importance of contraception generally, the speech
was commercial).
93. See id. at 63.
94. See id. at 63–64.
95. See id. at 75.
96. See id. at 66–67 (determining that the mailings were commercial speech); see also
Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REV. 55
(1999).
97. See, e.g., Shannon M. Hinegardner, Abrogating the Supreme Court’s De Facto
Rational Basis Standard for Commercial Speech: A Survey and Proposed Revision of the
Third Central Hudson Prong, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 523, 528 (2009) (proposing that a
“material evidence” standard should be used in applying Central Hudson’s third prong);
Nelson, supra note 37, at 52–55 (discussing how Central Hudson has been applied to
commercial speech cases).
98. See Krista Hessler Carver, A Global View of the First Amendment Constraints on
FDA, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 151, 170–75 (2008) (highlighting how the government can
typically fulfill the first two prongs, but litigation centers on the third and fourth); see also
Browne et al., supra note 14, at 107 (noting the “ease” with which the government can fulfill
the first two prongs of the Central Hudson test).
99. See Carver, supra note 98, at 174–76 (discussing how the Court has shifted the
government’s burden requirement under the third and fourth prongs since Central Hudson).
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under the third and fourth prongs. 100 In 1993, however, the Court started to
express a willingness to expand constitutional protection of commercial
speech, indicated in part by the Court requiring a higher evidentiary
standard for the government to meet its burden under the third and fourth
prongs. 101
a. The Evolution of the Central Hudson Prongs
The Supreme Court has stated that the third prong of Central Hudson
requires a speech restriction to “directly and materially advance[] the
asserted governmental interest.” 102
The Court has described this
requirement as “critical.” 103 The fourth prong requires that the regulation
not be “more extensive than [] necessary,” requiring the government to
demonstrate a narrow and reasonable fit between the challenged restriction
and the stated interest.104 Given the relationship between the two prongs,
the Court often assesses both together.
In Central Hudson, the Court did not outline the burden or evidence
required in order to satisfy the third and fourth prongs. In Metromedia, Inc.
v. San Diego, 105 however, the Court appeared to adopt a standard of
legislative deference.106 In this 1981 case, the Court evaluated the
constitutionality of a San Diego ordinance restricting outdoor billboards
within the city. 107
100. See Sean P. Costello, Strange Brew: The State of Commercial Speech Jurisprudence
Before and After 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 681, 748
(1997) (noting the change in the amount of protection that the Court is willing to extend
commercial speech).
101. See Daniel E. Troy, Advertising: Not “Low Value” Speech, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 85,
140 (1999) (noting that the Justices have been applying stricter, but not strict, scrutiny to the
third and fourth prongs in recent commercial speech cases); see also Michael Hoefges &
Milagros Rivera-Sanchez, “Vice” Advertising Under the Supreme Court’s Commercial
Speech Doctrine: The Shifting Central Hudson Analysis, 22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
345, 372 (2000) (discussing how the Court has increased the government’s burden to satisfy
the third and fourth Central Hudson prongs).
102. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc., v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999);
see also Browne et al., supra note 14, at 107 (discussing the direct advancement inquiry of
the third prong).
103. See Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 188.
104. See Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 (1993) (stating that the
government has the burden to show that it “‘carefully calculated’ the costs and benefits
associated with the burden on speech imposed by its prohibition” (quoting Bd. of Trs. of the
State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989))); see also Browne et al., supra note
14, at 108 (discussing the requirements of the fourth prong).
105. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
106. See Mark A. Conrad, Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v.
Fox—The Dawn of a New Age of Commercial Speech Regulation of Tobacco and Alcohol, 9
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 61, 75 (1990) (noting how the Court was deferential to the state
in Metromedia). But see Dale Carpenter, The Antipaternalism Principle in the First
Amendment, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 579, 599 (2004) (arguing that the Court in Metromedia
treated the billboards as regulating the manner of speech and not the speech itself, similar to
the Court’s reasoning in Chrestensen).
107. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 493–94 (stating that the ordinance allowed for on-site
commercial advertising, but forbade most other outdoor advertising signs unless they fell
within one of twelve exceptions).
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Applying Central Hudson to the restrictions on commercial speech, the
Court first found that the first two prongs of the test were easily met. 108 In
applying the third prong, the Court deferred to the local legislature’s
“common-sense” judgment, stating that the legislature was in the best
position to determine the most appropriate way to achieve its interest in
aesthetics and traffic safety. 109 The Court showed similar deference in its
application of the fourth prong, agreeing with the state’s argument that the
billboard ordinance was the most direct approach to addressing the traffic
hazard and aesthetic concerns of the municipality. 110 This decision was
relatively weak commercial speech protection because it appeared to
propose that the third and fourth prongs did not require any evidence and
that deference would be given to the state. 111
Following Metromedia, the Supreme Court showed less deference to
state legislatures in evaluating the validity of commercial speech
restrictions, but was still reluctant to expand constitutional protection for
commercial speech.112 In 1989, the Supreme Court focused on the fourth
prong in Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox,113
stating that commercial speech restrictions must have a reasonable fit
between the legislature’s means and ends, “not necessarily the least
restrictive means but . . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired
objective.” 114 Nevertheless, the Court stated that if a restriction meets this
burden, then it would defer to legislative judgment. 115
This standard was adopted by lower courts as a deferential stance slightly
short of the least restrictive means standard, only marginally tougher for
states to meet than the deferential standard established in Metromedia. 116
Fox illustrated the Supreme Court’s continued reluctance to expand
constitutional protection for commercial speech because the Court did not
require the state to show that a challenged regulation was the least
restrictive alternative.117

108. Id. at 507–08 (finding that the commercial speech was lawful and agreeing that the
state had a substantial interest).
109. Id. (reflecting the Court’s reluctance to expand commercial speech protection further
than what Central Hudson provided).
110. Id.
111. See Conrad, supra note 106, at 74–75 (highlighting how the Court in Metromedia
quickly found Central Hudson’s test satisfied, but was much more speech-protective while
analyzing the billboard’s effect on noncommercial speech).
112. See TEDFORD & HARBECK, supra note 38, at 208.
113. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
114. Id. at 480.
115. Id. (noting that the Court would defer to the government’s judgment if the restriction
was narrowly tailored).
116. See Hinegardner, supra note 97, at 529–30.
117. See Conrad, supra note 106, at 82–85 (discussing how lower courts interpreted Fox
as shifting the burden from the government to the party challenging the restriction, but how
this was subsequently overturned in Edenfield).
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b. The Court Expands Constitutional Protection for Commercial Speech
In 1993, the Court began to change its stance regarding the constitutional
protection afforded to commercial speech in Edenfield v. Fane. 118 In
Edenfield, the Court focused its evaluation of a commercial speech
restriction on the third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson. 119 Edenfield
concerned the constitutionality of a Florida Board of Accountancy rule
prohibiting licensed certified public accountants from obtaining new clients
through “direct, in-person, uninvited solicitation.” 120
Departing from its deferential position in earlier post-Central Hudson
cases, the Court in Edenfield shifted positions and ruled that the
government has the burden to provide sound evidence to support its
position. 121 The Court held that this restriction was unconstitutional
because the government did not meet its third prong evidentiary burden;
specifically, the government did not provide any anecdotal evidence to
support its contention that there would be harmful consequences without
the ban. 122
Two years later in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 123 lawyers challenged
Florida Bar Association rules imposing a thirty-day waiting period
following accidents and disasters before personal injury lawyers could
solicit victims and families, claiming the rules were a violation of their
commercial speech rights.124 The district court and the Eleventh Circuit
held that the rules violated the First Amendment. 125 The Supreme Court
agreed with the lower courts’ holdings that the first two prongs of Central
Hudson were met, but disagreed about the third and fourth prongs. 126
Finding that the third prong was met, the Court concluded that the
restriction directly and materially advanced the state’s interest in its
residents’ well-being. 127 The Florida Bar had submitted statistical evidence
highlighting the harmful effect of immediate solicitation on victims, which
118. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
119. See id. at 770 (finding that the first two prongs were satisfied because the state has a
substantial interest in regulating CPA solicitations to ensure independence).
120. See id. at 764–66 (internal citations omitted) (noting that the CPA challenging the
restriction in Florida had previously practiced accountancy in New Jersey, where direct, inperson, uninvited solicitation was permitted).
121. See id. at 770–71 (“[This] burden is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture;
rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must
demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them
to a material degree.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Hinegardner, supra note 97, at
536–37 (noting that Edenfield tightened the burden required for the third prong).
122. See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771–73 (discussing how Florida’s only supporting
evidence was testimony from the Florida Board of Accountancy’s chairman, whose
testimony was a series of conclusory statements without supporting evidence that did not add
to the Board’s justifications for the ban).
123. 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
124. See id. at 620 (holding that Florida Bar rules prohibiting targeted solicitations by
personal injury lawyers for thirty days following an accident or disaster do not violate the
Constitution).
125. See id. at 621–22.
126. See id. at 632–35.
127. See id. at 632–34.
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the Court noted was important to finding that the state had fulfilled its
burden. 128 Finally, the Court found that the fourth prong was met, agreeing
with the state’s argument that there were no reasonable alternatives to the
statute, and that the thirty-day restriction was a reasonable and well-tailored
fit given the state’s interest. 129 Thus, the Court concluded that the Florida
Bar rules were a permissible restriction on commercial speech, and upheld
them. 130
In both of these cases, the inclusion of statistical evidence was critical
because the Court displayed a willingness to independently assess the
evidentiary support for the restrictions rather than defer to state
legislatures. 131 This had the effect of enhancing the protection for
commercial speech.
D. The Commercial Speech Standard for Vice Advertising
The Supreme Court and legislatures have considered alcohol, gambling,
and tobacco advertising to be vice advertisements because they promote
socially harmful activities. 132 Despite the eagerness to regulate vice
advertising, the Court’s stance affording greater constitutional protection to
commercial speech generally has also been reflected in vice advertising
cases. 133 This section focuses on the commercial speech doctrine as
applied to vice advertising.
1. Gambling and the Rational Relationship Standard
Modern vice advertising doctrine began in 1986 with Posadas de Puerto
Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 134 a case concerning
governmental restrictions on gambling advertising. 135 The Supreme Court
adopted a paternalistic and deferential approach to local legislative
judgment in Posadas, 136 reflecting its position along the arc of commercial
128. See id. at 627 (“[The] anecdotal record [about the harms caused by immediate
solicitation] mustered by the Bar is noteworthy for its breadth and detail.”).
129. See id. at 632–34.
130. See id. at 634–35.
131. See generally Virelli, supra note 37, at 547–48 (discussing that while the Court
upheld the regulation in Florida Bar, it indicated that evidence was crucial for the state to
meet its evidentiary burden).
132. See, e.g., P. CAMERON DEVORE & ROBERT D. SACK, ADVERTISING AND COMMERCIAL
SPEECH: A FIRST AMENDMENT GUIDE 4–22 (1999); Hoefges & Rivera-Sanchez, supra note
101, at 361–62.
133. Compare Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 346 (1986)
(indicating that the Court might be willing to craft a vice advertising exception to the
commercial speech doctrine), with 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 514 (1996)
(noting that vice status does alone “provide a principled justification for the regulation of
commercial speech about that activity”).
134. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
135. See id.
136. See Nelson, supra note 37, at 52 (characterizing Posadas as paternalistic); see also
Daniel Helberg, Butt Out: An Analysis of the FDA’s Proposed Restrictions on Cigarette
Advertising Under the Commercial-Speech Doctrine, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1219, 1252–54
(1996) (noting that Posadas suggested judicial deference would be applied where a vice
activity is being regulated).
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speech doctrine between Metromedia 137 and Fox. 138 The Posadas Court
was reluctant to expand constitutional protection for commercial speech and
applied Central Hudson to find that the restrictions were constitutional.139
Finding that the first two prongs were easily met, the Supreme Court’s
analysis in Posadas turned on its application of the third and fourth
prongs. 140 Like its decision in Central Hudson, the Court found that the
third prong was satisfied by the legislature’s reasonable belief that
restricting casino gambling advertising would reduce demand; the Court
stated that this belief was “reasonable” as evidenced by the casino’s desire
to appeal the restriction all the way to the Supreme Court. 141 Finally, the
Court decided that the fourth prong was met, reasoning that because the
Puerto Rico Legislature could ban casino gambling outright, it could ban
and regulate casino gambling in whatever manner it saw fit.142
The Court followed Posadas with United States v. Edge Broadcasting
Co., 143 where it upheld regulations prohibiting radio stations from
broadcasting lottery advertisements in states that did not operate
lotteries. 144 As in Posadas, the Supreme Court in Edge Broadcasting took
a paternalistic approach and upheld the federal law.145
However, the Court revisited the gambling issue in Greater New Orleans
Broadcasting Ass’n, Inc. v. United States. 146 In Greater New Orleans, the
Court evaluated the constitutionality of section 316 of the Communications
Act of 1934, which prohibited the broadcasting of lottery and casino
gambling on the radio and television. 147 Even though gambling was legal
in Louisiana, the law prohibited broadcasters and television and radio
137. See supra notes 105–11 and accompanying text.
138. See Conrad, supra note 106, at 79–82 (noting that Posadas was significant because it
resulted in the Court giving more deference to the state when crafting commercial speech
restrictions).
139. See id. (discussing the Court’s reluctance to extend commercial speech protection
because of the vice nature of gambling advertising); see also Browne et al., supra note 14, at
100 (noting that the effect of Posadas was to “weaken the commercial speech doctrine by
affording deference to the states”); Joshua A. Marcus, Note, Commercial Speech on the
Internet: Spam and the First Amendment, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 245, 266–67
(1998) (same).
140. See Browne et al., supra note 14, at 99–100 (discussing how Posadas turned on the
third and fourth prongs).
141. See Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 342 (1986)
(reasoning that the appellant’s choice “to litigate this case all the way to this Court indicates
that appellant shares the legislature’s view”).
142. See id. at 346 (“[P]recisely because the government could have enacted a wholesale
prohibition . . . it is permissible for the government to [reduce] demand through restrictions
on advertising.”); see also Nelson, supra note 37, at 52.
143. 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
144. See Laura J. Schiller, The Lottery in United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.: Vice
or Victim of the Commercial Speech Doctrine?, 2 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L. FORUM 127, 130–
31 (1995).
145. See Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. at 426 (agreeing that the government’s interest in
discouraging gambling is substantial); see also Schiller, supra note 144, at 145–50
(examining the reasoning in Edge Broadcasting).
146. 527 U.S. 173 (1999) (holding that the statute banning lottery and gambling
advertisements was unconstitutional).
147. See id. at 177–78.
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station operators from broadcasting lottery and casino gambling
advertisements. 148 The broadcasters sued, claiming that the regulation, as
applied to them, violated the First Amendment. 149
Applying the Central Hudson test, the Court found that the first two
prongs were satisfied. 150 However, the Court did not find that the third and
fourth prongs were met. 151 The Court determined that the government’s
regulatory scheme regarding tribal versus private casino regulations was
inconsistent, given its stated interests in reducing gambling and preventing
gambling in states that restrict gambling. 152
Although Greater New Orleans did not directly overrule Posadas or
Edge Broadcasting, the Court seemed to require more rigorous proof of a
connection between the means and ends of governmental commercial
speech restrictions even in vice advertising cases, and not just in general
commercial speech cases. 153
2. Alcohol Advertising
a. Alcohol Consumption in America
After Prohibition ended, alcohol opponents continued to push for
increased alcohol regulation, citing the harms of youth drinking.154
Alcohol lobbyists scored a significant victory during the Vietnam era when
several states set the legal drinking age at eighteen or nineteen,155 but by
the mid-1980s, alcohol opponents successfully lobbied for federal
legislation that effectively forced states to set their minimum drinking age
at twenty-one. 156 Today, all states have a minimum drinking age of twentyone. 157 Despite these efforts, alcohol remains readily available to those
under twenty-one, and underage and abusive drinking by college students is
a major concern for states and universities.158

148. See id. at 180–81.
149. See id. (discussing how the district court upheld the statute as applied to the
broadcasters under Central Hudson, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed).
150. See id. at 184–87.
151. See id. at 188–95.
152. See id. at 191–92 (finding inconsistency because the government was very
supportive of tribal casinos while limiting private casinos).
153. See Nelson, supra note 37, at 54–55 (discussing how Greater New Orleans halted
the Court’s paternalist stance towards gambling restrictions).
154. See Judith G. McMullen, Underage Drinking: Does Current Policy Make Sense?,
10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 333, 338 (2006) (noting how Prohibition left lasting attitudes
about the harmful effects of alcohol consumption).
155. See id. at 339 (noting that one of the reasons people argued for an eighteen-year-old
drinking age during the Vietnam War era was that eighteen-year-olds were eligible for the
draft); see also HENRY WECHSLER & BERNICE WUETHRICH, DYING TO DRINK: CONFRONTING
BINGE DRINKING ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES 30 (2002).
156. See McMullen, supra note 154, at 339.
157. See id. (noting the nationwide drinking age).
158. See Elissa R. Weitzman, Controlling Misuse of Alcohol by College Youth:
Paradigms and Paradoxes for Prevention, in SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTROL OF ALCOHOL
159–69 (Carole L. Jurkiewicz & Murphy J. Painter eds., 2008).
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The Supreme Court and lower courts generally accept that the individual
and societal harms associated with alcohol abuse are so numerous that there
is always a substantial government interest in regulating alcohol
advertisements. 159 This idea is rooted in the notion that the government can
regulate health hazards.160
Binge drinking, or heavy episodic drinking, is rampant among these
college students aged eighteen to twenty-four. 161 A recent study found that
approximately 50 percent of college students aged eighteen to twenty report
binge drinking. 162
b. Alcohol Advertising and the First Amendment
Alcohol advertising is a highly regulated industry, with the FTC and
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives both overseeing
alcohol advertising. 163 Despite this dual oversight, alcohol advertising is
the most advertised vice activity in the United States. 164
The Supreme Court first indirectly considered the constitutionality of
alcohol advertising restrictions in Queensgate Investment Co. v. Liquor
Control Commission of Ohio. 165 Queensgate involved a prohibition
regarding off-premises advertisements of alcoholic beverage prices.166 The
Ohio Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to the
prohibition, stating that the legislature was permitted by its power under the
Twenty-first Amendment to promulgate the prohibition. The Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal, stating that there was no substantive federal
question, which technically was an affirmance of the Ohio court’s ruling.167
This dismissal created confusion among the circuit courts regarding what
the relationship is between the First and Twenty-first Amendments in the
alcohol advertising arena. 168
159. See Marc L. Sherman, Note, We Can Share the Women, We Can Share the Wine:
The Regulation of Alcohol Advertising on Television, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1107, 1120–21
(1985) (stating that the substantial government interest in regulating alcohol is not debated).
160. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730–31 (1963) (noting that the government
can regulate health hazards, but must still respect constitutional limits).
161. The National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism has defined binge drinking
as “consuming 5 or more drinks (male), or 4 or more drinks (female), in about 2 hours.” See
NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., What Colleges Need to
Know:
An Update on College Drinking Research (Nov. 2007), available at
http://www.niaaa.nih.gov/Publications/EducationTrainingMaterials/Documents/1College_B
ulletin-508_361C4E.pdf (noting the prevalence and harmful effects of binge drinking).
162. See WECHSLER, supra note 155, at 10.
163. See Sherman, supra note 159, at 1110–13.
164. See WECHSLER, supra note 155, at 10.
165. 459 U.S. 807 (1982).
166. See Queensgate Inv. Co. v. Liquor Control Comm’n of Ohio, 433 N.E.2d 138 (Ohio
1982) (the state decision).
167. See Mark Steffey, Tension Between the First and Twenty-First Amendments in State
Regulation of Alcohol Advertising, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1439–51 (1984).
168. See id. at 1434–37 (noting how, in subsequent cases, the Court’s dismissal in
Queensgate caused confusion by implying that states had authority over liquor
advertisements through the Twenty-first Amendment, without addressing the relationship
between the Twenty-first and First Amendments in the area of alcohol advertising).
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The Court clarified its position on the constitutionality of restrictions on
alcohol advertising in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co. 169 In Rubin, the
Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of section 205(e)(2) of the
Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 170 which banned beer manufacturers
from disclosing alcohol content on their labels.171 Coors Brewing
Company filed suit, claiming that the federal statute was a violation of the
First Amendment, as an unlawful abridgment of commercial free speech.172
The government asserted two substantial interests in the regulation: (1)
section 205(e)(2) curbs “‘strength wars’” between beer manufacturers;173
and (2) section 205(e)(2) aids state efforts to control alcohol
consumption. 174 Applying the Central Hudson test, imputed from general
commercial speech cases, the Court found that the speech in question was
lawful and not misleading, and that the government had a substantial
interest in prohibiting alcohol content information on beer labels to prevent
“strength wars.” 175
For the third prong, the Court applied the standard set forth in Edenfield,
and found that the Government did not meet its burden to prove that section
205(e)(2) directly and materially advanced its stated interest in preventing
strength wars between beer manufacturers because alcohol content was
allowed in beer advertisements but not on labels, and descriptive terms
indicating a high alcohol content were allowed but not the content itself. 176
Additionally, the Court did not agree that Coors’s pursuit of litigation
against section 205(e)(2) evinced a plan to display alcohol content on beer
In its holding, the Court
labels to facilitate “strength wars.”177
distinguished its reasoning in Posadas regarding whether to defer to
legislative judgment. 178 In Rubin, rather than deferring to the federal
agency’s judgment, the Court independently assessed whether the ban met
the third prong based on the evidence that the government provided to
support its position, and concluded that the statute did not directly advance

169. 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (holding that a federal regulation prohibiting beer labels from
displaying alcohol content was an unconstitutional abridgement of the First Amendment).
170. 27 U.S.C. § 205 (2006).
171. See id. at 478–79 (discussing how the challenged statute prohibited beer labels from
including the alcohol content of the beverage on the label).
172. See id. (noting how Coors filed suit after unsuccessfully petitioning to print alcohol
content on their beer labels).
173. See id. at 483–84 (identifying the government’s argument that allowing beer
manufacturers to display alcohol content on beer labels will lead to the manufacturers
competing for customers on the basis of that alcohol content, so that by prohibiting the
alcohol content, the government is decreasing the number of consumers who choose a beer
based on its alcohol content).
174. See id. at 485–86.
175. See id. at 483–86 (internal citations omitted).
176. See id. at 486–89.
177. “Strength wars” referred to the government’s concern that alcohol manufacturers
were seeking to display alcohol content on labels solely to compete for market share based
on alcohol content. Id. at 483.
178. See id. at 482 n.2 (“Neither Edge Broadcasting nor Posadas compels us to craft an
exception to the Central Hudson standard . . . .”).
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the government’s interest because it was irrational. 179 This displayed how
the Court was now willing to use its own judgment to question legislative
bans rather than simply deferring to legislative judgment as it did in
Posadas. 180
Additionally, the Court held that the statute failed the fourth prong of
Central Hudson, finding that a number of alternatives to the statute existed
that “would prove less intrusive to the First Amendment’s protections for
commercial speech.” 181 This was an indirect repudiation of the Court’s
reasoning in Posadas, because there the Court simply accepted the
legislature’s ability to impose a ban as evidence that the ban was
reasonable.182 This was also a tightening of the fourth prong standard set
forth in Fox. 183 The Court thus concluded that Section 205(e)(2) was
unconstitutional. The Court’s decision in Rubin was a setback to those
calling for a vice advertising exception in commercial speech cases.184
In 1996, the Supreme Court revisited the constitutionality of restrictions
on alcohol advertising in 44 Liquormart, Inc., v. Rhode Island. 185 In 44
Liquormart, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of two Rhode Island
statutes prohibiting liquor advertisements from displaying prices. 186 The
petitioners in 44 Liquormart brought suit in Rhode Island district court,
claiming that the two Rhode Island statutes prohibiting price advertising for
alcoholic beverages violated the First Amendment. 187
In its decision, the Court reaffirmed its position that it would not create a
vice advertising exception to the commercial speech doctrine.188
Additionally, the Court noted that absolute bans on certain types of
commercial speech, like the one at issue in 44 Liquormart, should be
evaluated more rigorously than a partial ban or less stringent regulation.189
The Court opined that the state’s interest in keeping alcohol prices high to
179. Id. at 488 (reiterating that the Government’s scheme was irrational).
180. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing how the Court deferred to
legislative judgment in Posadas); see also Hinegardner, supra note 97, at 539–42 (discussing
how Rubin was a repudiation of the reasoning in Posadas).
181. See Rubin, 514 U.S. at 491.
182. See supra notes 134–142 and accompanying text (discussing Posadas).
183. Compare Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989)
(explicitly rejecting the least restrictive alternative standard for the fourth prong of the
commercial speech test when determining to uphold a governmental regulation), with Rubin,
514 U.S. at 491 (applying the least restrictive alternative standard for the fourth prong of the
commercial speech test, and ultimately holding that the government restriction was
unconstitutional).
184. See Devore, supra note 11, at 3 (noting that this “delivered the quietus to the socalled vice exception”); see also Rubin, 514 U.S. at 481–82.
185. 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (holding that a Rhode Island state ban on advertising alcohol
prices was an unconstitutional infringement of the First Amendment).
186. See id. at 489–90 (noting that the first Rhode Island statute prohibited alcohol
beverage price advertisements in Rhode Island and that the second prohibited media or
advertising companies from advertising alcohol prices in all newspapers, periodicals,
broadcast advertisements, and other businesses located in Rhode Island).
187. See id. at 493–94.
188. See id. at 501–05.
189. See id. at 501 (stating that the burden on the State is greater when determining the
constitutionality of a complete ban).
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avoid increased consumption at lower levels was substantial, but warned
that for the state to meet the third prong of Central Hudson, it would have
to present evidence that the ban had a significant impact on reducing
alcohol rates. 190 The Court agreed with the state’s argument that
commonsense judgment supported the claim that prohibiting price
advertising would maintain higher prices, but concluded that the lack of
evidentiary support prevented the state from satisfying the third prong. 191
Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the majority, further noted that
reliance only on commonsense arguments would amount to engaging in
“speculation or conjecture.” 192
The Supreme Court also held that the fourth prong of Central Hudson
was not met, given the large availability of alternatives that could aid the
state’s interest in temperance promotion.193 Rejecting its reasoning in
Posadas, the Court held that legislative judgment was not enough to satisfy
the burden of the fourth Central Hudson prong. 194 Finally, the Court
rejected Rhode Island’s argument that since it has superior authority to
completely ban alcohol, it could restrict alcohol advertisements, moving
further from the Court’s decision in Posadas. 195
3. Tobacco Advertising
The Supreme Court’s most recent vice advertising case, Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 196 addressed the constitutionality of restrictions on
tobacco advertising. The Court reaffirmed and expanded the four-part
Central Hudson test, rejecting the view that the government can regulate
Tobacco
advertising to discourage unhealthy human behaviors. 197
advertisements have been the focus of far more litigation than alcohol
advertisements. 198
In Lorillard, the Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of two
One restricted outdoor tobacco
Massachusetts regulations. 199
advertisements, prohibiting tobacco advertisements within 1,000 feet of

190. See id. at 505.
191. See id. at 505–07.
192. See id. at 507 & n.18 (noting that in other alcohol-related cases, the Court had not
upheld alcohol advertising restrictions where the government relied on speculative evidence
to support its claims about a ban’s impact on consumption).
193. See id. at 507.
194. See id. at 509–10 (concluding “that a state legislature does not have the broad
discretion to suppress truthful, nonmisleading information for paternalistic purposes”).
195. Compare id. at 511 (“Contrary to the assumption made in Posadas . . . banning
speech may sometimes prove far more intrusive than banning conduct.”), with supra note
142 and accompanying text (discussing how the Posadas Court noted that the power to ban
includes the lesser power to heavily regulate).
196. 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
197. See id. at 553–55, 561.
198. See generally Calvert et al., supra note 17. Much of this early litigation did not
center on the Central Hudson analysis and is beyond the scope of this Note, so it will not be
discussed here. See id.
199. See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 534–35.
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schools or playgrounds. 200 The second regulation sharply restricted on-site
tobacco advertisements by requiring that establishments place tobacco
advertisements at least five feet above the ground to ensure that children
could not see them. 201 Massachusetts claimed that the state’s interest in the
restriction was to decrease tobacco use by children because tobacco
products constitute a health hazard.202 The majority held that the first two
prongs were met because the speech in question was lawful and because the
government had a substantial interest in reducing youth demand for tobacco
products. 203
The bulk of the Court’s analysis focused on the third and fourth
prongs. 204 First, the Court analyzed the constitutionality of the outdoor
advertising restrictions and found that the third Central Hudson prong was
met, because the government provided sufficient anecdotal evidence
showing a direct link between advertising and youth demand for tobacco
products. 205 However, the Court did not find that the fourth prong was met
because the ban was so broad. 206 Despite accepting a broad ban under the
fourth prong in Fox, 207 the Lorillard Court expressed unease with the fact
that the regulation on outdoor tobacco advertising effectively constituted a
complete ban. 208 The Court noted that adults have an interest in receiving
information about cigar and smokeless tobacco products because adult use
of these products is lawful, just as manufacturers and retailers have an
interest in conveying information.209 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor,
writing for the majority, expressed concern that the regulation restricted
speech that adults desired. 210 Finally, the Court identified several
alternative means by which the state could advance its interest in reducing
youth tobacco product use. 211
Next, the Court analyzed the constitutionality of the on-site advertising
regulations and concluded that the third prong was not met because the
regulation’s scheme was irrational and inconsistent. 212 The Court also
found that the on-site restriction did not meet the fourth prong because it
was overbroad and limited adults’ access to information. 213

200. See id. at 553, 556.
201. See id. at 566.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 555.
204. See id. at 560–66.
205. See id. at 561.
206. See id. at 561–63 (holding that the ban was broad because it affected very large
portions of metropolitan areas in Massachusetts).
207. See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text.
208. See Lorillard, 533 U.S at 561–66 (noting that the ban would prevent cigar and
smokeless tobacco advertising in a majority of Massachusetts’s metropolitan areas).
209. See id. at 564.
210. See id. at 528–30 (discussing tobacco restrictions and competing interests).
211. See id. at 561.
212. See id. at 566 (concluding that the on-site advertisements were irrational because
children could look up and still see the advertisements).
213. See id. at 564, 567.
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Justice Clarence Thomas, concurring in judgment, used Lorillard to
reiterate his view that commercial speech should be subject to the same
protection as noncommercial speech. 214 Justice Thomas stated that
advertising restrictions should not be used to promote any interest besides a
“fair bargaining process.” 215 Additionally, Justice Thomas explicitly
rejected suggestions for a “vice” exception to the First Amendment. 216
II. THE SPLIT BETWEEN THE THIRD AND FOURTH CIRCUITS
Part II examines the circuit split between the Third and Fourth Circuits
regarding the proper application of Central Hudson to determine the
constitutionality of governmental restrictions on alcohol advertisements in
college student publications. First, Part II details the Third Circuit’s
decision in Pitt News v. Pappert, 217 which followed Supreme Court
precedent on this issue and concluded that a prohibition on alcohol
advertisements in college student publications was a violation of the First
Amendment. Next, Part II discusses the Fourth Circuit’s decision in
Educational Media Co. at Virginia Tech, Inc. v. Swecker, 218 which departed
from the Supreme Court’s standard for evaluating vice advertising
restrictions. The Fourth Circuit held that a restriction on alcohol
advertising in college student publications was not facially unconstitutional.
A. The Third Circuit Holds that Prohibitions on Alcohol Advertisements
in College Student Publications Are Not Valid Restrictions
on Commercial Speech
In Pitt News, the Third Circuit held that a Pennsylvania regulation
restricting alcohol advertising in college student publications was an
unconstitutional infringement on the freedom of expression as applied to
Pitt News, a University of Pittsburgh student publication, following the
Court’s reasoning in Rubin, 219 44 Liquormart, 220 and Lorillard. 221
1. Act 199: The Challenged Pennsylvania Statute
In 1996, the Pennsylvania Legislature amended Pennsylvania’s Liquor
Code, enacting what is popularly known as “Act 199.” 222 The legislative
214. See id. at 577, 588–89 (Thomas, J., concurring) (opining that allowing restrictions on
tobacco advertising to protect children was a slippery slope, which could lead to restrictions
on fast food advertising to prevent child obesity or restrictions on alcohol advertising to
prevent underage drinking).
215. See id. at 577, 588–89.
216. See id. (calling for strict scrutiny review to evaluate the constitutionality of
restrictions on commercial speech).
217. 379 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2004).
218. 602 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 646 (2010).
219. See supra notes 169–84 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 185–95 and accompanying text.
221. See supra Part I.D.3.
222. See Pitt News v. Pappert (Pitt News II), 379 F.3d 96, 102 (3d Cir. 2004). Act 199
states, in relevant part:
§ 4-498. Unlawful Advertising
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history surrounding the Act does not explain its purpose; however,
Pennsylvania asserted in district court proceedings that Act 199 was
intended to address underage drinking on college campuses, as well as
campus binge drinking by both underage students and adult students. 223
Act 199 regulated alcohol advertisements in college student
publications. 224 Criminal sanctions were imposed on those who violated
Act 199. 225 The Bureau of Liquor Control Enforcement (BLCE) was
responsible for investigating Act 199 violations and facilitating arrests.226
The Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (LCB) was responsible for
interpreting Pennsylvania state laws binding on the BLCE, and the LCB
interpreted Act 199 as only being enforceable against alcohol advertisers,
such as retailers or restaurants advertising alcohol in college student
publications, but not the publications in which the advertisements were
placed. 227 Additionally, in an informational publication about Act 199, the
LCB clarified that advertisements for a licensed alcohol vendor that did not
contain any beverage references were permissible. 228 Finally, the LCB
stated that Act 199 did not implicate magazines and newspapers circulated
on college campuses that had no connection to the campuses. 229
2. The Pitt News Alleges that Act 199 Is a Violation
of Its Constitutional Rights
In December 1997, the Fuel & Fuddle restaurant canceled its
longstanding contract with the Pitt News after being cited for an Act 199
violation. 230 The News, in an effort to protect its other advertisers, stopped
accepting alcohol advertisements, and tried unsuccessfully to convince
liquor retailers to submit advertisements that complied with Act 199. 231 In
(e) The following shall apply to all alcoholic beverage . . . advertising:
(4) The use in any advertisement of alcoholic beverages of any subject
matter, language or slogan directed to minors to promote consumption of
alcoholic beverages is prohibited. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to
restrict or prohibit any advertisement of alcoholic beverages to those persons
of legal drinking age.
(5) No advertisement shall be permitted, either directly or indirectly, in any
booklet, program book, yearbook, magazine, newspaper, periodical, brochure,
circular or other similar publication published by, for or in behalf of any
educational institution.
47 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4-498(e) (West Supp. 2011).
223. See Pitt News v. Fisher (Pitt News I), 215 F.3d 354, 358 (3d Cir. 2000). See
generally supra Part I.D (discussing the prevalence of underage and binge drinking on
college campuses).
224. See Pitt News I, 215 F.3d at 357.
225. See id. at 357–58 (discussing how Act 199 violations were misdemeanors and
punishable by a fine of up to $500 or imprisonment); see also Pitt News II, 379 F.3d at 102
(same).
226. See Pitt News I, 215 F.3d at 358–59.
227. See id.
228. See Pitt News II, 379 F.3d at 102.
229. See id.
230. See Pitt News I, 215 F.3d at 359.
231. See Pitt News II, 379 F.3d at 103 (noting how other advertisers canceled their
advertising contracts with the Pitt News).
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1998, The News suffered a $17,000 advertising revenue loss, which
effectively shortened the paper, 232 impeded its ability to make capital
expenditures, and had other deleterious effects.233
In April 1999, the Pitt News sued the Pennsylvania Attorney General, the
BCLE Director, and the LCB Chairman in the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania, alleging that the enforcement of Act 199
violated its constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with the
rights of the paper’s readers and advertisers. 234 After a hearing to
determine whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the district court
denied the News’s motion, holding that the paper lacked standing to
challenge Act 199’s constitutionality on behalf of its readers and
advertisers, and had not suffered any personal injury, and therefore could
not assert First Amendment claims on its own behalf. 235
In June 2000, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a
preliminary injunction on appeal.236 The Third Circuit agreed that the
News did not have standing to assert third-party claims; however, the court
determined that since the News had suffered an advertising loss, it had
standing to challenge Act 199. 237 Despite this, the Third Circuit concluded
that the preliminary injunction had been properly denied. 238 The Pitt News
then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, which
was denied. 239
3. Act 199: Unconstitutional as Applied to the Pitt News
Following the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in 2001, the parties
cross-motioned for summary judgment. 240 On February 13, 2003, the
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. 241 The Pitt
News appealed this decision to the Third Circuit, which exercised plenary
review of the district court’s order. 242
The Third Circuit panel held that despite Pennsylvania’s arguments that
the college student publications could still print unpaid alcohol
advertisements, “[i]mposing a financial burden on a speaker based on the
232. See Pitt News I, 215 F.3d at 359 (noting that because the Pitt News was required to
run an equal proportion of advertisements and text, the reduction in advertisements forced
the paper to limit the amount of space in which it could print articles and photographs).
233. See Pitt News II, 379 F.3d at 103.
234. See id.; see also Pitt News I, 215 F.3d at 359.
235. See Pitt News II, 379 F.3d at 103 (stating that the paper did not suffer any injury
because it could still publish what it wanted, as long as it did not accept paid advertisements
violating the ban, and holding that the paper could not allege First Amendment rights on
behalf of its readers and advertisers).
236. See id.
237. See Pitt News I, 215 F.3d at 362 (noting that the Pitt News had standing to bring a
claim because its loss of advertising revenue was a redressable injury).
238. See id. at 366 (noting that the Pitt News did not have a good chance at succeeding on
the merits).
239. See Pitt News v. Fisher, 531 U.S. 1113 (2001).
240. See Pitt News II, 379 F.3d at 104.
241. See id.
242. See id.
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content of the speaker’s expression is a content-based restriction of
expression and must be analyzed as such.” 243 Concluding that Act 199 was
a restriction of commercial speech, the Third Circuit panel applied Central
Hudson to evaluate the constitutionality of the restriction.244 It noted that
the first two prongs of the test were satisfied: (1) the First Amendment
protected the commercial speech in question; and (2) the governmental
interest was, “at minimum, ‘substantial.’” 245
The court concluded that the third and fourth prongs of the test were not
satisfied. 246 According to the Third Circuit, in an opinion written by thenCircuit Judge Samuel Alito, the ban did not directly and materially advance
the governmental interest in lowering underage and abusive drinking rates
by college students because it only restricted one form of media targeting
college students. Nor was the ban narrowly tailored to achieve its stated
objective of lowering underage drinking rates because the majority of
readers were of legal drinking age. 247 Additionally, the court resolved that
the restriction further violated the First Amendment by imposing a financial
burden on a distinct part of the media; namely, university media.248
In the Third Circuit’s analysis of the third prong, it established that the
Pennsylvania statute did not directly and materially advance the
government’s interest. 249 The court stated that Pennsylvania’s burden
under the third prong would not be “‘satisfied by mere speculation or
conjecture.’” 250 Additionally, the court resolved that a challenged
restriction would not be upheld if it facilitated “ineffective or remote
support for the government’s purpose,” 251 or has only a small likelihood
that it will further the state’s interest.252 This analysis was consistent with
the Supreme Court’s third prong analysis in the later Central Hudson
commercial speech cases, decided after the Supreme Court took a less
deferential approach, including the recent vice advertising cases.253
To meet its third prong burden, Pennsylvania claimed that the
“elimination of alcoholic beverage ads from The Pitt News and other
publications connected with the University will slacken the demand for
alcohol by Pitt students.” 254 This claim fell short of the state’s third prong
243. Id. at 106.
244. See id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 107–09.
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. See id. at 107.
250. See id.; supra notes 118–22 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Edenfield;
see also supra Part I.D.3 (describing the Court’s holding in Lorillard).
251. See Pitt News II, 379 F.3d at 107 (internal citations omitted).
252. See id.
253. See supra Parts I.C–D.
254. See Pitt News II, 379 F.3d at 107 (noting how Pennsylvania argued that, because
alcohol advertising encourages consumption, Act 199 discourages underage and abusive
drinking by limiting access to alcohol advertisements by underage college students). The
Third Circuit did not agree with this assertion because Act 199 only applied to a very narrow
sector of the college campus media, and Pennsylvania failed to provide evidence that the
restriction had the intended effect of reducing underage and abusive drinking. See id.
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burden, 255 similar to the result in Rubin and 44 Liquormart. 256 According
to Judge Alito, this claim lacked empirical evidence, and relied on “nothing
more than ‘speculation’ and ‘conjecture’” to support Pennsylvania’s
contentions about the effectiveness of Act 199 in reducing underage and
abusive drinking. 257
Additionally, the Third Circuit expressed discomfort with the fact that
students were still subject to alcohol advertisements in a variety of media,
such as television, radio, and other publications, such that limiting
advertisements in newspapers would not significantly reduce exposure.258
This demonstrated an inconsistency in Pennsylvania’s attitude to alcohol
laws, 259 similar to that which the Supreme Court highlighted in Rubin.260
In Rubin, the restriction prohibiting alcohol content on beer bottles, but not
malt liquor bottles, was determined to be an inconsistency in the
government’s reasoning. 261 Here, the Third Circuit used Rubin to discuss
how this inconsistency in Pennsylvania’s restriction supported the result
that the Pennsylvania legislature had not met their burden under Central
Hudson’s third prong. 262
Analyzing the fourth prong, the Third Circuit held that Act 199 was “not
adequately tailored to achieve [Pennsylvania’s] asserted objectives,”
concluding that the Act was not a reasonable fit between the state’s interest
and the narrowly tailored means of achieving that interest. 263 The court
stated that the Act was both over-inclusive by restricting lawful adults on
campus from accessing alcohol advertisements in college publications, as
well as under-inclusive by only limiting college publications, without
addressing other media on campus through which underage and lawful
students were exposed to alcohol advertisements. 264 Additionally, the
Third Circuit adopted the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Lorillard265 to
show that the restriction was not narrowly tailored, pointing out that like the

Additionally, the Third Circuit decided that it was counterintuitive to believe that Act 199
would reduce college students’ demands for alcohol, and that Pennsylvania failed to provide
evidence that Act 199 would make it harder for students to find alcohol retailers near
campus. See id.
255. See id. (noting that Pennsylvania used a commonsense argument: because alcohol
advertisements generally increased demand for alcohol, restricting advertisements should
decrease demands). The Third Circuit did not dispute the assertion that alcohol advertising
encourages consumption; however, the court stated that the converse was unsupportable
without empirical evidence proving the claim. See id.
256. See supra Part I.D.2.
257. See Pitt News II, 379 F.3d at 107–08.
258. See id. at 107.
259. See id.
260. See supra notes 169–84 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 169–84 and accompanying text.
262. See Pitt News II, 379 F.3d at 107.
263. See id. at 108.
264. See id. at 108–09.
265. See id. at 108 (noting how the Supreme Court in Lorillard found that the restriction
was not narrowly tailored because it limited access to adults, who could legally buy tobacco
products); see also supra Part I.D.3 and accompanying text.
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advertising restrictions in Lorillard, Act 199 prevented adults who could
lawfully purchase alcohol from accessing alcohol advertisements.266
Finally, the Third Circuit identified several alternatives to the challenged
restriction in Pitt News that would better serve Pennsylvania’s interest.267
The court stated that the most direct method available to Pennsylvania
would be to fully enforce alcohol beverage laws on college campuses. 268
The Third Circuit concluded that Act 199 violated the First Amendment
for a second reason: it imposed a financial burden on a narrow sector of the
media, media associated with a college or university. 269 The court decided
that Act 199 was presumptively unconstitutional, and required Pennsylvania
to show that Act 199 was necessary to further its substantial interest in the
regulation, which it did not do.270 As such, the court determined that this
was a second, independent reason for Act 199’s unconstitutionality. 271
B. The Fourth Circuit Holds that Restrictions on Certain Alcohol
Advertisements in College Student Publications Are Valid
1. The Challenged Virginia Administrative Code
The Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, a subsidiary of the
Department of Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control, is responsible for
regulating alcohol advertisements throughout Virginia. 272 With this
regulatory authority, it enacted an alcohol advertising regulation in the
1970s, updated in the 1990s, which prohibited “various types of
advertisements for alcohol in any college student publication.”273 The
restriction included “any college or university publication . . . that is: (1)
prepared, edited or published primarily by its students; (2) sanctioned as a
266. See Pitt News II, 379 F.3d at 108 (finding that the Pennsylvania restriction was too
broad because it banned alcohol advertisements in all university publications, even those
with a substantial majority of readers who were over the age of twenty-one).
267. See id.
268. See id. (discussing research that showed just how lax enforcement of alcohol
beverage control laws were on college campuses, which the Court determined was the most
direct way to reduce underage and abusive drinking on college campuses).
269. See id. at 109–12.
270. See id. at 111.
271. See id. at 111–12.
272. 602 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 646 (2010).
273. See id. at 587 (discussing the challenged Virginia statute). Section A(2) of the
Virginia statute states the following:
Advertisements of alcoholic beverages are not allowed in college student
publications unless in reference to a dining establishment. . . . A ‘college student
publication’ is defined as any college or university publication that is prepared,
edited or published primarily by students at such institution, is sanctioned as a
curricular or extra-curricular activity by such institution and which is distributed or
intended to be distributed primarily to persons under 21 years of age.
3 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-20-40(A)(2) (2008). Section A(3) states:
Advertisements of alcoholic beverages are prohibited in publications not of general
circulation which are distributed or intended to be distributed primarily to persons
under 21 years of age, except in reference to a dining establishment . . . .
Id. § 5-20-40(A)(3).
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curricular or extracurricular activity; and (3) distributed or intended to be
distributed primarily to persons under 21 years of age.” 274 Regulated
publications could not print any alcohol advertisements, including those for
“beer, wine or mixed beverages,” unless the advertisement was for a dining
institution. 275 Virginia claimed that this regulation sought to further its
interest in reducing underage or dangerous consumption of alcohol on
college campuses. 276
2. The Eastern District of Virginia Uses Pitt News to Find
the Virginia Restriction Invalid
Two Virginia publications affected by this advertising regulation, the
Collegiate Times and the Cavalier Daily, classified as college student
publications despite having a majority of readership over twenty-one,
challenged the statute as a violation of their First Amendment rights.277
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that the
statute was facially unconstitutional as an invalid ban on commercial
speech. 278
In Educational Media Co., the district court relied on the analysis in Pitt
News. 279 First, the court agreed with the plaintiffs that the first Central
Hudson prong was met, as the speech in question was both lawful and
truthful. 280 The court then agreed with the defendants regarding the second
prong, stating that reducing underage and excessive drinking by college
students is a substantial government interest.281
A significant portion of the district court opinion was dedicated to the
third Central Hudson prong, the direct advancement requirement.282
Noting that the government bears the burden to demonstrate this
requirement, the district court relied on the post-Edenfield line of
commercial speech cases to ascertain what evidentiary showing was
required. 283 Although the defendants suggested that the district court

274. Educ. Media Co., 602 F.3d at 587 (internal citations omitted).
275. See id. (noting that even though dining establishments could submit advertisements,
they were restricted to using the following terms to reference alcohol beverages: “A.B.C.
on-premises, beer, wine, mixed beverages, cocktails, or any combination of these words.”).
276. See Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech, Inc., v. Swecker, No. 3:06CV396, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 45590, at *33–34 (E.D. Va. Mar. 31, 2008) (internal citations omitted).
277. See id. at *29.
278. See id. at *57.
279. See id. at *32; see also supra Part II.A.
280. See Educ. Media Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45590, at *30–32 (relying on the Third
Circuit’s reasoning in Pitt News, which held that since the activity in question was lawful,
and the speech not misleading, it was clearly protected by the First Amendment); see also
supra Part II.A.
281. See Educ. Media Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45590, at *33–34; see also supra notes
161–62 and accompanying text (detailing problems with underage and binge drinking on
college campuses).
282. See Educ. Media Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45590, at *34–37; see also supra notes
71–89 and accompanying text (discussing Central Hudson).
283. See Educ. Media Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45590, at *34–36.
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simply determine if the statute was reasonable,284 the court concluded that
this reasonableness standard utilized in Posadas was no longer good law, 285
employing Pitt News to show how circuit courts read the direct
advancement requirement narrowly. 286
The district court carefully scrutinized Virginia’s evidence showing that
the ban directly and materially advanced the government’s interest in
reducing underage and excessive drinking on college campuses.287
Virginia provided evidence consisting of one expert, several college
administrators, and statistics regarding the prevalence and negative effects
of underage and excessive drinking on college campuses. 288 The expert,
Dr. Henry Saffer, presented his research, which found that limiting alcohol
advertisements would reduce alcohol and binge drinking rates in adults
aged 18–20. 289 Dr. Saffer believed that college newspapers were a special
type of media, with no reasonable substitute; 290 thus, banning
advertisements in college publications would reduce alcohol consumption
because advertisers could not substitute another medium for college
newspapers. 291 The district court did not find this argument persuasive. 292
The college administrators, citing statistical evidence on underage and
binge drinking rates, highlighted the problem that Virginia faced with
drinking on college campuses. 293 However, the district court was interested
in reviewing evidence showing how the ban itself affected drinking rates
from its enactment in the 1970s. 294 The lack of evidence showing the
impact of the ban and similar advertising restrictions persuaded the district
court that the regulation did not directly advance the government’s interest
in reducing underage and excessive college drinking rates to a material
degree. 295 Therefore, the district court concluded that the third Central
Hudson prong was not met. 296

284. See id. at *34–47 (noting how Virginia argued that the district court defer to
legislative judgment in crafting the ban, relying on Posadas); see also supra notes 135–42
and accompanying text (discussing Posadas).
285. See Educ. Media Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45590, at *37–38.
286. See id. at *38 (noting how the Fourth Circuit in Pitt News expressed that the very
fact that college students were still exposed to a torrent of advertisements detracted from the
government’s direct advancement argument).
287. See id. at *40–47.
288. See id. at *40–44 (discussing Virginia’s evidence).
289. See id. at *40–46.
290. See id.
291. See id. (discussing how Dr. Saffer’s conclusions depended on college students not
exposed to any media containing alcohol advertisements).
292. See id. at *46 (noting how Dr. Saffer’s testimony ignored the reality that college
students now live in a multimedia environment, exposed to television, radio, and other media
outlets, all of which include alcohol advertisements).
293. See id. at *41–45; see also supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text (discussing
alcohol abuse among college students).
294. See Educ. Media Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45590, at *42 (internal citations
omitted).
295. See id. at *47.
296. See id.

2011]

PARTY FOUL IN EDUCATIONAL MEDIA CO.

1357

Applying the fourth prong of Central Hudson, the district court
determined that the regulation was not narrowly tailored. 297 The plaintiffs
used the Commonwealth’s expert to show the availability of alternatives;
Dr. Saffer admitted that taxing alcohol and counter-advertising would serve
the same state interest.298 Additionally, Virginia did not use any evidence
to show that the restriction was narrowly tailored. 299
3. The Fourth Circuit Reverses, Directly Contradicting the Third Circuit
The Fourth Circuit distinguished Educational Media Co. from Pitt News,
stating that Pitt News was an “as applied challenge.” 300 The court stated
that unlike an as-applied challenge, in a facial challenge, the burden for the
government is lower, because a court must simply determine as a question
of law whether the government meets its burden under Central Hudson,
without considering the statute’s “impact on the plaintiff asserting the facial
challenge.” 301 The court then went on to apply the Central Hudson test.302
Like the Third Circuit in Pitt News, the Fourth Circuit found that the first
two prongs were met. 303 The speech in question was lawful and not
misleading, and the court agreed that the government’s interest in reducing
underage and abusive drinking on college campuses was substantial. 304
The Fourth Circuit, unlike the Third Circuit in Pitt News, relied on
“history, consensus, and common sense” to find that there was a direct link
between advertising bans on college publications and a decreased demand
for alcohol among college students. 305 The Fourth Circuit found support
for its treatment of “history, consensus, and simple common sense” in
Burson v. Freeman, 306 a First Amendment case involving non-commercial
speech in which the Court upheld a “campaign-free zone” within 100 feet of
a polling place. 307
The Fourth Circuit found that the relationship between alcohol
advertising and demand for advertising would not justify an advertising ban
in every situation involving a harmful activity, but found that the
relationship in Educational Media Co. did support the ban.308 The
justification given was that the ban here was justified because “college
student publications primarily target college students.” 309 As such, the
297. See id. at *48.
298. See id.
299. Id. at *53.
300. See Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech, Inc. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583, 588 n.4 (4th Cir.
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 646 (2010) (noting that the district court used both terms but
determining that the district court meant to find the statute facially unconstitutional).
301. Id. at 588.
302. See id.
303. Id. at 589.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. 504 U.S. 191, 210 (1992).
307. See id. at 211. This argument was similar to an argument rejected by the Supreme
Court in 44 Liquormart. See supra notes 185–86 and accompanying text.
308. Educ. Media Co., 602 F.3d at 590.
309. See id. (internal citations omitted).
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Fourth Circuit stated that it was “counterintuitive for alcohol vendors to
spend their money on advertisements in newspapers with relatively limited
circulation, directed primarily at college students, if they believed that these
ads would not increase demands by college students.” 310
Finally, in finding that the third prong of Central Hudson was met, the
Fourth Circuit stated that the college publications challenging the ban had
not presented any evidence to refute Virginia’s assertion that alcohol
advertisements in college student publications would increase the demand
for alcohol among those college students. 311 Thus, in a marked departure
from the precedent of the Third Circuit and Supreme Court, the Fourth
Circuit shifted the burden of the third prong to those challenging a
restriction, stating that it was up to the plaintiffs to dispute the link between
the Virginia statute and college student drinking rates. 312 This reasoning
departs from most vice advertising cases applying Central Hudson.313
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit held that the fourth prong of Central
Hudson was met. 314 The statute was narrowly tailored because it only
affected college student publications whose readership is predominantly
under twenty-one years of age, and it only banned certain types of alcohol
advertisements. 315 Additionally, the Court noted that the ban here was not
a complete ban, as it only restricted certain types of alcoholic beverages in
certain publications. 316 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit held that the statute
was facially constitutional.317
4. The Dissent: Pitt News Should Be Followed Here
The dissenting judge in Educational Media Co. district judge Norman K.
Moon sitting by designation, stated that by applying Central Hudson in a
manner consistent with Pitt News, both the third and fourth prongs were not
met. 318 Judge Moon noted that Virginia’s interest was reducing underage
and abusive drinking on college campuses, not simply reducing general
underage college student drinking. 319 He stated that the challenged
restriction was incorrectly applied to the two student publications, as both
papers showed that the majority of their readers were over the age of
twenty-one. 320
310. See id. But see supra note 195 and accompanying text (noting that the Supreme
Court rejected a similar argument in 44 Liquormart).
311. See Educ. Media Co., 602 F.3d at 590 (noting that the newspapers failed to “provide
evidence to specifically contradict this link”).
312. Id.
313. See supra notes 169–95 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Rubin and 44 Liquormart).
314. See Educ. Media Co., 602 F.3d at 590.
315. See id. at 590–91.
316. See id.
317. Id. at 591.
318. See id. at 592–94 (Moon, J., dissenting).
319. Id. at 594.
320. See id. at 595 n.7 (arguing that this was unconstitutional as applied because both
publications provided evidence showing that the majority of their readers were over the age
of twenty-one).
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Additionally, Judge Moon conducted his own analysis of the third and
fourth prongs of Central Hudson. 321 Regarding the third prong, Judge
Moon implied that since both publications had a majority of readers over
the age of twenty-one, the “common sense” argument relied on by the
majority was not applicable. 322 The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning regarding
advertisers’ desire to advertise in college student publications as evidence
that the advertising was directly linked to demand was “speculative,” and
by exempting certain types of alcohol advertisements, the statute displayed
an “internal inconsistency.” 323
Furthermore, Judge Moon pointed out that the affidavit that the Fourth
Circuit relied on as evidence supporting its application of the third prong
made mention of the fact that “there is . . . very little empirical evidence that
alcohol advertising has any effect on actual alcohol consumption,” and that
“a ban on advertising in one medium generally results in greater advertising
saturation in other media or forms of marketing.” 324 Dr. Saffer, who gave
the affidavit, admitted that there were no studies he could point to that
showed the effectiveness of an alcohol advertising ban in college student
publications at reducing even general drinking rates on campus. 325
Finally, Judge Moon wrote that he did not believe that the fourth prong
was met, because the statute’s ban on certain types of alcohol
advertisements was not the most effective way to advance the governmental
interest, given the existence of other proven and more direct means, such as
increasing alcohol taxes, increasing advertising warnings of the dangers of
drinking, raising alcohol prices, and simply banning prices on alcohol
advertisements. 326 He also noted that the Virginia statute singled out
alcohol advertisements in college student publications, without attempting
to regulate other alcohol advertisements on campus. 327
III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S STANDARD IS MOST CONGRUENT
WITH SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
As discussed, the Pitt News and Educational Media Co. courts applied
the Central Hudson test differently when evaluating governmental
restrictions on alcohol advertisements in college student publications. Part
III considers each Circuit’s application of the third and fourth prongs, and
concludes that the Fourth Circuit erred in its Central Hudson application. It
first discusses the slight differences between the two cases and why these
differences are not significant enough to warrant differing conclusions.
Next, Part III examines the differing applications of Central Hudson and
321. See supra notes 71–89 and accompanying text (discussing the third and fourth
Central Hudson prongs).
322. See Educ. Media Co., 602 F.3d at 591–93.
323. Id. at 593–94 (discussing that the majority did not follow the Court’s third prong
burden, established in Edenfield and all following cases); see also supra Part I for a
discussion of the Supreme Court’s evolving application of the third prong.
324. Educ. Media Co., 602 F.3d at 593 n.5 (internal citations omitted).
325. See id.
326. See id. at 596 n.8.
327. See id.
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highlights why the Fourth Circuit’s analysis of the third and fourth prongs
was incorrect. Finally, Part III concludes by proposing that the Supreme
Court resolve the split by adopting the clear Third Circuit standard for
evaluating governmental restrictions on alcohol advertisements in college
student publications.
A. Minor Differences Between the Two Circuit Cases
1. The Challenged Statutes Are Substantively Similar
The statute that the Third Circuit analyzed, Act 199, 328 was a broad ban,
prohibiting all alcohol advertisements in any publications published for or
on behalf of any colleges or universities.329 Act 199 was enforceable
against alcohol retailers who published advertisements in applicable
publications. 330 Publications that circulated on college campuses but had
no connection to those campuses were exempt. 331
In contrast, the challenged restriction in Educational Media Co.
prohibited only certain alcohol advertisements in college student
publications, 332 allowing restaurants with liquor licenses to publish
advertisements including vague references to alcohol sold on premises.333
Despite the Fourth Circuit’s determination that the Virginia restriction was
not a broad ban, 334 the restriction broadly restricts commercial speech by
effectively disallowing most types of alcohol advertisements in Virginia
college student newspapers. 335 Thus, although proponents of the Virginia
restriction may argue that it has less of an impact on First Amendment
rights, the restriction is still a broad ban limiting commercial speech
because it affected all campus-affiliated papers and every alcohol-related
advertisement any publication wanted to print.336
2. The Type of Challenge Should Not Matter
Unlike the Third Circuit in Pitt News, the Fourth Circuit declined to
address whether the challenged Virginia statute was unconstitutional as
applied to the two student publications bringing the action. 337 The Fourth
Circuit simply evaluated whether the challenged Virginia restriction was
facially unconstitutional.338 Unlike an as-applied challenge, a facial
328. See supra notes 222–29 and accompanying text (discussing Act 199).
329. See supra notes 222–29 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 227–28 and accompanying text.
331. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 272–76 and accompanying text (discussing the challenged Virginia
statute).
333. See supra notes 272–76 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 314–17 and accompanying text (discussing the Fourth Circuit’s
reasoning to uphold the ban).
335. See supra notes 189, 208–09 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 208–09 and accompanying text.
337. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
338. See supra note 300 and accompanying text (discussing how the Fourth Circuit
declined to hear the case as an as-applied challenge because the district court held the statute
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challenge to the constitutionality of a commercial speech restriction can be
resolved as a question of law when the government meets its Central
Hudson burden. This is significant because it allows the appellate court to
make its own legal determinations without deferring to the district court.339
Although the majority opinion in Educational Media Co. distinguished
Pitt News as an as-applied challenge, 340 this distinction is misleading.341
Facial challenges usually succeed only by showing that the challenged law
is unconstitutional in all applications. 342 But this is not the standard for
First Amendment cases, and does not explain why the Fourth Circuit treated
the facial challenge differently than the Third Circuit treated the as-applied
challenge. 343
Furthermore, the Central Hudson analysis is the same whether applied in
a facial or as-applied challenge. 344 Thus, although there is a difference in
the type of challenges at issue here, the circuit split still exists regarding the
proper application and evidentiary standard of Central Hudson when
evaluating governmental restrictions on alcohol advertisements in college
student publications. 345
B. The Supreme Court Should Resolve the Circuit Split by Reversing the
Fourth Circuit and Clarifying Its Vice Advertising Stance
1. The Supreme Court’s Denial of Certiorari
The Supreme Court denied Educational Media’s petition for certiorari.346
Litigation continues, however, as the two college papers continue to pursue
an as-applied challenge in the district court.347 Additionally, two other
states still have laws restricting alcohol advertisements in college student
publications, so that the Supreme Court may once again be called on to

facially unconstitutional). But see supra notes 318–20 and accompanying text (noting that
the dissent in Educational Media Co. expressed that this could have been heard as applied in
part because the statute was incorrectly applied to the two papers bringing the suit).
339. See supra notes 300–02 and accompanying text (discussing standard for facial
versus as-applied challenge).
340. See supra notes 300–02 and accompanying text.
341. The distinction is misleading because both still require the same Central Hudson
application. See supra notes 300–02 and accompanying text.
342. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party
Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1339 (2000) (noting that the distinction between facial
and as-applied challenges is not clear enough to warrant an automatic or controlling effect).
343. See supra notes 300–02 and accompanying text (noting that the facial challenge
burden is lower in First Amendment challenges).
344. See supra notes 318–23 and accompanying text.
345. See supra Part II.
346. See Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech, Inc., v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 646 (2010).
347. See Educational Media Company at Virginia Tech v. Swecker, ACLU,
http://acluva.org/176/educational-media-company-at-virginia-tech-v-swecker/ (last visited
Nov. 16, 2011).
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resolve the issue. 348 Therefore, despite the Court’s denial of certiorari, the
circuit split persists and still requires resolution.349
2. The Fourth Circuit Relied on Mere Speculation and Conjecture While
Analyzing the Third Prong, Contradicting Supreme Court Precedent
Although there is consensus on the application of the first two prongs of
the Central Hudson test, 350 the proper evidentiary standard for the third
prong continues to plague lower courts, despite the Supreme Court’s
clarification in Rubin, 44 Liquormart, and Greater New Orleans. 351 This
Note asserts that the Fourth Circuit erred in applying the third Central
Hudson prong in three ways.
First, the commonsense link that the Fourth Circuit relied on as evidence
is speculative and similar to arguments previously rejected by the Court.352
Virginia argued that the fact that advertisers were challenging the ban was
evidence that the advertisements would increase demand and curtail the
This same argument was made by the
government’s interest. 353
government in Rubin and rejected. 354
The second way in which the Fourth Circuit erred was by accepting Dr.
Saffer’s testimony without statistical proof of his claims as evidence that
the advertising ban on alcohol advertisements in college student
publications would curtail underage and excessive drinking on college
campuses. 355 Dr. Saffer admittedly lacked empirical evidence to support
his claims. 356 Furthermore, as the district court noted, this argument was
irrational because Virginia college students were still exposed to alcohol
advertisements on campus from a variety of unregulated media outlets,
which casts doubt on the effectiveness of this ban. 357 This displayed an
348. There are three states that currently prohibit or restrict alcohol advertisements in
college student publications: New Hampshire, Utah, and Virginia. See N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 179:31 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 81-1-17 (2011); 3 VA.
ADMIN. CODE § 5-20-40 (2010).
349. See supra Part II.
350. See supra notes 246–72, 303–17 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 146–53, 169–95 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court’s evidentiary requirements in those cases).
352. See supra notes 146–53, 169–95 and accompanying text.
353. Compare supra notes 308–10 (discussing Virginia’s supporting evidence, claiming
that alcohol vendors would not advertise in college student publications if they did not
believe that those advertisements would increase demand among college students), with
supra notes 146–53 (noting that the Court in Greater New Orleans rejected the
government’s argument that allowing advertising would increase demand, finding that the
argument was too causal), 169–95 (noting how the Court in Rubin rejected similar
speculative evidence regarding advertising and demand) and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 177–80 (discussing the Supreme Court’s rejection of the
government’s argument in Rubin).
355. Compare supra notes 307–09, 324–25 (discussing how the Fourth Circuit accepted
Virginia’s evidence), with supra notes 288–96 (district court rejecting same proof because it
found that to accept the proof as evidence would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence).
356. See supra notes 288–96, 323–24 (noting that the restriction had been in place for
over thirty years when litigation began).
357. See supra notes 290–91 and accompanying text.
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inconsistency in Virginia’s college alcohol policy, similar to the
inconsistency displayed by the government’s regulatory scheme in Rubin,
and should not have been credited. 358
Finally, and most significantly, the Fourth Circuit’s analysis was
incorrect because it did not require Virginia to show statistical evidence
proving the effectiveness of the ban. The Virginia alcohol restriction had
been in place for over thirty years when litigation began. 359 Despite this,
Virginia was unable to provide any statistical evidence proving the
restriction’s effectiveness at reducing underage and excessive drinking rates
on college campuses during this time. 360 The Fourth Circuit did not
address this lack of evidence, displaying a deferential stance towards the
legislature. Given the Court’s precedent, it is unlikely that this ban would
survive scrutiny by the Supreme Court.361 The Court has emphasized the
importance of empirical support since shifting its stance on commercial
speech in Edenfield. 362 The Fourth Circuit’s decision is troubling because
it weakens commercial speech by echoing the Court’s analysis in Posadas,
reasoning the Court has long since repudiated. 363
In contrast to the Fourth Circuit and in line with the Supreme Court, the
Third Circuit expressed its understanding of the vice advertising subset as
requiring the government to provide evidence to meet its burden under the
third Central Hudson prong. 364 Pennsylvania made similar arguments
when trying to uphold its restriction.365 However, the Third Circuit found
that the lack of evidence supporting the state’s claims, along with the antipaternalist view the Court showed in Rubin, 44 Liquormart, and Greater
New Orleans, required it to find that the state did not meet its burden.366
The Fourth Circuit’s reliance on commonsense and testimony lacking
evidentiary support was a departure from recent Supreme Court vice
advertising cases. 367 Although the state does have a substantial interest in
curtailing underage and excessive drinking on college campuses, these
restrictions limit adults’ access to alcohol advertisements. The Court has

358. See supra notes 174–77 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 272–76 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 286–96 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 146–53, 169–95 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court’s recent treatment of vice advertising bans).
362. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing how the Court changed its
stance in Edenfield by shifting the burden for the third prong to the government).
363. Compare supra note 145 and accompanying text (noting that the Court in Posadas
accepted paternalistic government reasoning), with supra notes 121–22 and accompanying
text (noting that the Court required more than paternalistic reasoning in Edenfield).
364. See supra notes 249–62 and accompanying text (discussing how the Third Circuit
interpreted the post-Edenfield cases as requiring evidentiary support).
365. See supra notes 249–62 and accompanying text (discussing how Pennsylvania made
similar commonsense arguments as Virginia, which the Third Circuit did not accept).
366. See supra notes 146–53, 169–95, 249–62 and accompanying text (discussing the
post-Edenfield vice advertising cases).
367. See supra notes 122, 196–206 and accompanying text.
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indicated concern about such a situation.368 Proponents of alcohol
advertising restrictions argue that the serious problem of underage and
excessive binge drinking justifies limits on commercial speech in college
publications. 369 However, despite these concerns, restrictions that limit
commercial speech should not be upheld in the absence of evidence
showing that those restrictions directly advance the state’s interest.370
Thus, the Third Circuit’s reasoned application of the third Central Hudson
prong in college alcohol advertising cases should be applied.371
3. The Fourth Circuit Improperly Placed an Evidentiary Burden on Parties
Challenging Governmental Restrictions
The Fourth Circuit also erred in its analysis of Central Hudson’s third
prong by placing an evidentiary burden on the publications challenging
governmental restrictions. 372 The Supreme Court has established that
government actors seeking to uphold restrictions on commercial speech
have the burden of providing evidence to prove that the burden directly and
materially advances the government’s interest. 373 The Fourth Circuit’s
apparent burden shift is a direct contradiction of this precedent, and should
be reversed. 374
4. The Fourth Circuit Did Not Consider the Numerous Alternatives
Available Under the Fourth Central Hudson Prong
Under its analysis of the fourth prong, the Fourth Circuit determined that
the restriction was narrowly tailored because it only affected college student
publications with a majority of readers under twenty-one, and allowed
certain advertisements referencing alcoholic beverages. 375 Additionally,
the Fourth Circuit noted that this restriction complemented the state’s other
efforts at reducing underage and excessive drinking. 376
The Supreme Court has displayed an increasingly speech-protective
stance when analyzing the fourth prong in Central Hudson cases, even in
vice cases. 377 Although the Virginia restriction was specifically tailored
and part of a comprehensive effort, the state did not meet its evidentiary
burden to show how the restriction was necessary in light of the
368. See supra notes 196–206 and accompanying text (noting how the majority in
Lorillard was concerned with how the restriction at issue there limited the access that adults
had to lawful information about tobacco products).
369. See supra Part I.D.2.a and accompanying text (noting the problems with alcohol
policy).
370. See supra Part I.D.
371. See supra Part II.A.3 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 311–13 and accompanying text (discussing how the Fourth Circuit
expressed the view that the two Virginia publications did not present enough evidence
showing why the ban did not meet the third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson).
373. See supra Parts I.C–D.
374. See supra notes 311–13 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 314–17 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 314–17 and accompanying text.
377. See supra Part I.
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comprehensive effort. 378 The state mentioned that it aimed at reducing
underage and excessive drinking on college campuses includes educational
programs and enforcement efforts. 379 These types of programs have proven
to be more effective at reducing underage and excessive college drinking;
thus, the state should have been required to show why the commercial
speech restriction was necessary in light of the other two programs.380
Given the Court’s recent protection of commercial speech, the existence of
two effective programs that do not restrict speech does not explain why a
speech restriction is also necessary, especially since the Virginia restriction
solely restricted advertisements in college papers and not in all campus
media. 381
The policies and studies discussed in Part I.D.2 indicate that although
alcohol advertising influences demand for alcohol, limiting alcohol
advertising is not the most efficient means of curtailing underage and
excessive drinking on college campuses. 382 Alternative policies, such as
dedicated campus enforcement efforts of drinking laws, increased taxation
on alcohol, and multi-pronged education efforts have proven more effective
at educating college students about the risks of underage and excessive
drinking, and at encouraging changes in these drinking patterns. 383 Given
the availability of alternatives, despite the Virginia restriction’s “narrow”
application, the Fourth Circuit should not have determined that the fourth
prong of Central Hudson was met.
CONCLUSION
Colleges and universities face a grave problem with underage and
excessive drinking on their campuses. While alcohol advertising may
generally influence demand, this does not justify unconstitutional
restrictions on commercial speech. States interested in curtailing underage
and binge drinking should focus their regulatory efforts on enforcing
alcohol beverage laws and educating students about the dangers of drinking,
rather than adopting paternalistic approaches to the problem like the
challenged Virginia statute at issue in Educational Media Co. Given the
importance of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court should take the
next opportunity to reaffirm the constitutional protections afforded to vice
advertising.

378. See supra notes 314–17, 326–27 and accompanying text (noting Judge Moon’s
disagreement with the majority’s fourth prong application).
379. See supra notes 314–17 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 263–71 and accompanying text (discussing more effective policies
for reducing underage and excessive drinking on college campuses).
381. See supra Part I (detailing how the fourth prong has consistently required that the
government show why a challenged restriction is necessary to achieve its stated interest).
382. See supra Part I.D.2.
383. See supra notes 297–99 and accompanying text (detailing the district court’s
application of the fourth Central Hudson prong in Educational Media Co.).

